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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/755,028	01/08/2001	Arnold L. Levine	03848.00061	4950
28315	7590	02/04/2005	EXAMINER	
BANNER & WITCOFF LTD., ATTORNEYS FOR AFFYMETRIX 1001 G STREET, N.W. ELEVENTH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4597			SISSON, BRADLEY L	
		ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER
		1634		
DATE MAILED: 02/04/2005				

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary	Application No.	Applicant(s)	
	09/755,028	LEVINE ET AL.	
	Examiner Bradley L. Sisson	Art Unit 1634	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM
THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 17 November 2004.
- 2a) This action is FINAL. 2b) This action is non-final.
- 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) Claim(s) 31-41 and 67-70 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) Claim(s) 31-41 and 67-70 is/are rejected.
- 7) Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) The drawing(s) filed on 08 January 2001 is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) All b) Some * c) None of:
 1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 4) Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____
- 5) Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) Other: _____

DETAILED ACTION***Specification***

1. The specification is objected to as documents have been improperly incorporated by reference. In particular, the specification states at page 6 of the specification that various documents cited are “incorporated herein for all purposes by reference.” Such omnibus language fails to specify what specific information applicant seeks to incorporate by reference and similarly fails to teach with detailed particularity just where that specific information is to be found in each of the cited documents. As set forth in *Advanced Display Systems Inc. v. Kent State University* (Fed. Cir. 2000) 54 USPQ2d at 1679:

Incorporation by reference provides a method for integrating material from various documents into a host document--a patent or printed publication in an anticipation determination--by citing such material in a manner that makes it clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein. *See General Elec. Co. v. Brenner*, 407 F.2d 1258, 1261-62, 159 USPQ 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1968); *In re Lund*, 376 F.2d 982, 989, 153 USPQ 625, 631 (CCPA 1967). **To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.** *See In re Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 674, 177 USPQ 144, 146 (CCPA 1973) (providing that incorporation by reference requires a statement “clearly identifying the subject matter which is incorporated and where it is to be found”); *In re Saunders*, 444 F.2d 599, 602-02, 170 USPQ 213, 216-17 (CPA 1971) (reasoning that a rejection or anticipation is appropriate only if one reference “expressly incorporates a particular part” of another reference); *National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.*, 274 F.2d 224, 230, 123 USPQ 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1959) (requiring a specific reference to material in an earlier application in order to have that material considered a part of a later application); *cf. Lund*, 376 F.2d at 989, 153 USPQ at 631 (holding that a **one sentence reference to an abandoned application is not sufficient to incorporate from the abandoned application into a new application**). (Emphasis added.)

Attention is also directed to MPEP 608.01(p)I, which, in pertinent part, is reproduced below:

Mere reference to another application, patent, or publication is not an incorporation of anything therein into the application containing such reference for the purpose of the

disclosure required by 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. *In re de Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 177 USPQ 144 (CCPA 1973). In addition to other requirements for an application, the referencing application should include an identification of the referenced patent, application, or publication. Particular attention should be directed to specific portions of the referenced document where the subject matter being incorporated may be found. (Emphasis added)

Accordingly, the cited documents are not considered to have been properly incorporated by reference and as such, have not been considered with any effect towards their fulfilling, either in part or in whole, the enablement, written description, or best mode requirements of 35 USC 112, first paragraph.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

2. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 31-41 and 67-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Attention is directed to the decision in *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.* 68 USPQ2D 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2004) at 1428:

To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. *Vas-Cath*, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also *Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 [41 USPQ2d 1961] (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012

[10 USPQ2d 1614] (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed"). Thus, an applicant complies with the written-description requirement "by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious," and by using "such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention." Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.

3. In accordance with claim 1, one is to determine the level of transcription of any of a plethora of disclosed "genes," which are defined by name and or accession number. In accordance with claim 67, the only other independent claim, the "genes" are identified by accession numbers. The specification does not provide an adequate written description of the nucleic acids so identified, and a review of the disclosure fails to identify where the nucleic acids identified by accession numbers has been incorporated by reference. In short, the nucleotide sequence of the innumerable "genes" has not been provided. Such disclosure is essential to practicing the claimed methods.

4. For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 31-41 and 67-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.

Claims 31-41 and 67-70 remain rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. As set forth in *Enzo Biochem Inc., v. Calgene, Inc.* (CAFC, 1999) 52 USPQ2d at 1135, bridging to 1136:

To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation.' " *Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S*, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting *In re Wright*, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513

(Fed. Cir. 1993)). Whether claims are sufficiently enabled by a disclosure in a specification is determined as of the date that the patent application was first filed, see *Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986).... We have held that a patent specification complies with the statute even if a "reasonable" amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must not be "undue." See, e.g., *Wands*, 858 F.2d at 736-37, 8 USPQ2d at 1404 ("Enablement is not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation . . . However, experimentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation. The key word is 'undue,' not 'experimentation.' ") (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). In *In re Wands*, we set forth a number of factors which a court may consider in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation. These factors were set forth as follows: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. *Id.* at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. We have also noted that all of the factors need not be reviewed when determining whether a disclosure is enabling. See *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd.*, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the *Wands* factors "are illustrative, not mandatory. What is relevant depends on the facts.").

As presented above, the specification does not provide an adequate written description of the very "genes" whose nucleotide sequence is to be evaluated on the basis of translation.

Accordingly, the specification has not provided starting material required to practice the claimed methods. Absent such essential starting materials, the skilled artisan cannot practice the claimed invention without having to resort to undue experimentation. The situation at hand is analogous to that in *Genentech v. Novo Nordisk A/S* 42 USPQ2d 1001. As set forth in the decision of the Court:

" '[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.' *In re Wright* 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *see also Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.*, 927 F. 2d 1200, 1212, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1026 (Fed Cir. 1991); *In re Fisher*, 427 F. 2d 833, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970) ('[T]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.').

"Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable. *See Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 148 USPQ 689, 696 (1966) (starting, in context of the utility requirement, that 'a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.') Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure. While every aspect of a generic claim certainly need not have been carried out by an inventor, or exemplified in the specification, reasonable detail must be provided in order to enable members of the public to understand and carry out the invention.

"It is true . . . that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art. *See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1385, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure. It means that the omission of minor details does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skill in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement. This specification provides only a starting point, a direction for further research. (Emphasis added)

5. For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 31-41 and 67-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 1 12, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.

Response to argument

6. At page 2 of the response received 17 November 2004, hereinafter the response, applicant's representative asserts that the genes recited were known in the art as of the filing date, and that "the invention of claim 31 is not the discovery of a set of genes *per se*. The subject invention is a method of using a set of known genes."

7. The above arguments have been fully considered and have not been found persuasive for applicant is required to disclose that which is essential to the claimed invention. In the instant case, the sequences of the various genes are essential to practicing the claimed invention. Additionally, the reaction conditions under which the multitude of different sequences are to be sued is also essential to providing the requisite full, clear and concise description of the invention. Such level of disclosure has not been found within the four corners of the instant application. While applicant is urged not to provide that which is well known in the art in order to satisfy the enablement requirements under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, the instant rejection is directed towards the written description requirement.

8. While claim 1, for example, provides a listing of numerous genes, the claim does not recite any particular accession number for said genes. Accordingly, the claim fairly encompasses variants of each. The record fails to provide an adequate written description of such sequences, and there is no evidence of record that establishes that the variants of the genes were known at the time of filing.

9. As shown above, the relative ease or obviousness of an invention cannot be relied upon in order to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 USC 112, first paragraph.

10. At page 3 of the response argument is advanced that “a known substance need not be described in any particular way,” and that “the methods employ known compositions.”

11. The above argument ahs been fully considered and has not been found persuasive. As indicated above, the recited “genes” in claim 1 do not teach the nucleotide sequence, the amino acid sequence, or the accession number for either. A cursory review of the data presented in Table 1A-1C shows that the listed “genes” are not in fact genes, but rather, partial sequences, be

it mRNA, DNA, etc. Such showing does not constitute a gene, which is construed as comprising introns, exons, promoter regions, etc. Such detailed teachings are not provided even if one were to rely upon the information associated with the respective accession numbers found in Figure 1A-1C, which, as noted above, are limitations not recited in the claims. Accordingly, there is no convincing evidence to record that supports the conclusion that the complete genes were known at the time of filing.

12. Applicant's representative, at page 4, asserts:

The prior art contained a description of each of the genes by sequence. The inventor pointed the reader directly to those sequences by providing Gen bank accession numbers in the specification. This combination of facts does not leave any undue experimentation to be done; it leaves no experimentation to be done.

13. The above argument has been fully considered and has not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection as the claimed method is not directed to the genes, or their sequences, but rather, to a method where the level of expression of any one or combination of said genes is used to determine the "carcinogenicity of an agent." The specification has not set forth a reproducible procedure, complete with starting materials and reaction conditions that would allow for the accurate and reproducible evaluation of carcinogenicity of any agent. Even if one were to make a determination of expression level for any one or combination of genes, the specification does not set forth a reproducible procedure as to how this is to be interpreted or a given individual, much less take into consideration factors such as gender, age, preexisting conditions, medication, etc. Further, the specification is silent as to how carcinogenicity is to be evaluated when the gene is not from any cell, e.g., is found in a virus, e.g., 153585 EBNA-2-NUCLEAR PROTEIN (Epstein-Barr virus).

14. For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 31-41 and 67-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 1 12, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.

Conclusion


15. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

16. A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

17. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (571) 272-0751. The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

18. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, W. Gary Jones can be reached on (571) 272-0745. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.

19. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).



Bradley L. Sisson
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1634

BLS
03 February 2005